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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate drivers of corporate venture capital investment announcements. Using a 
comprehensive sample of investments made by corporate venture capital programs of publicly listed 
US corporations, we find that about 2/3 of the investments are publicly announced. Consistent with 
voluntary information disclosure theories, we find that a public announcement is less likely when the 
startup is in the seed-stage, but more likely when the parent company is large, spends heavily in 
internal R&D and capital expenditures, has high leverage ratio, and faces more information 
asymmetry problems. These results are robust to controlling for syndicate size and structure. We 
further examine the stock price reaction to announcements. On average, the abnormal return of 
announced deals is around 2.1% at announcement date. Controlling for endogeneity of the 
announcement decision, we find that parent companies facing most severe asymmetric information 
problems enjoy highest abnormal returns.  
 
Keywords: information disclosure; public announcements; corporate venture capital   
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1. Introduction 
In innovation-driven industries, corporations invest heavily in research and development (R&D) in 
order to maintain their leadership in their current market or to become one in new markets in the 
future. Corporations are often silent about their current R&D projects, in order to provide as little 
information to competitors as possible. Otherwise it could affect their future competitive position in 
the market. For instance, Apple keeps secret its new products until they are publicly announced at 
the annual fair. Any announcement done earlier would reveal which market the corporation intends 
to be active in the future and adjust their own corporate strategy accordingly. Interestingly, other 
corporations make clear announcements as a way to strategically communicate to investors and 
thereby influence anticipations (Narayanan, Pinches, Kelm and Lander, 2000). Disclosing privately-
valuable information can provide worthwhile signals to the market, even though some of this 
information may also be valuable to competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). 
When investments in innovative ideas take place in form of external investments such as venture 
capital (commonly called corporate venture capital [CVC]), an announcement may take place. This 
potentially reveals valuable information to investors as well as to competitors.1 CVC programs have 
become integral parts of innovation activities of many large corporations such as 3M, Adobe 
Systems, AT&T, Cisco, Dell, General Electric, Intel, Johnson & Johnson, Microsoft, Novartis, Oracle, 
Siemens, Walt Disney, Xerox, and many more.2 It allows these corporations to access innovative 
ideas outside their firm boundaries, next to developing their own R&D projects internally.  CVC 
programs make direct equity investments into startup firms, mostly in business areas that are similar 
                                                          
1
 &Žƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? /ŶƚĞů ĂƉŝƚĂů ? /ŶƚĞů ?Ɛ s ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ? ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇ ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚ ŽŶ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ŝƚƐ  ? ? ? ŵŝůůŝŽŶ
investment in Grisoft, a leading manufacturer of the AVG antivirus program (Source: Intel News Release 
 “Intel Capital To Acquire $16M Stake In Grisoft, A Leading Security Software Company ? Ăƚ
http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/2005/20050906corp.htm ; viewed on May 2, 2013). 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ /ŶƚĞů ?Ɛ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ƉƌĞƐƐ ƌĞůĞĂƐĞ ?  “/ŶƚĞů ǁŝůů ǁŽƌŬ ƚŽ ŚĞůƉ 'ƌŝƐŽĨƚ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŽŶ ĐŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ
ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐĨŽƌƐŵĂůůďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ? ?
2
 Dushnitsky (2012) offers a comprehensive survey of research on corporate venture capital, as well as a 
discussion on the different forms of CVC. In terms of importance of the phenomenon, Basu, Phelps, and 
Kotha (2011) report that around 17% of the Fortune 500 companies (the top 500 U.S. companies annually 
ranked by revenue) relied on CVC investments during the 1990 W2000 period. Taking an international 
perspective, Da Gbadji, Gailly and Schwienbacher (2012) find that 29% of the Fortune Global 500 companies 
had active CVC programs during the 2008 W2011 period. 
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to those of the parent company or not too distant away. While some are managed internally in form 
of business unit, others are structured as subsidiary and thus as a separate legal entity (Dushnitsky, 
2012). 
In this paper, we examine what drives corporations that run a CVC program to announce their CVC 
investments publicly. Several theories argue that information disclosure may be strategic decisions 
of corporations and thus affect the likelihood of having an announcement (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 
1983). One of the crucial factors that we investigate is the extent of information asymmetry that the 
parent company faces with the market for its current activities (Ferreira and Rezende, 2007; Fishman 
and Hegerty, 2003), as disclosing this information may help reduce the asymmetry. Further, we 
explore whether the ƉĂƌĞŶƚ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ĚĞďƚ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ. 
According to Perotti and von Thadden (2005), companies which rely more on debt are less likely to 
disclose critical information, since banks can collect this information through monitoring the 
borrower. In contrast, companies which rely more on equity will disclose more, since they are more 
depend on equity investors, who rely on corporate disclosure to price shares. A third factor arising 
from the voluntary disclosure theories is firm size (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991), where larger 
corporations are expected to benefit more from disclosure because they rely more on the 
participation of institutional investors for whom liquidity of shares is more important. In contrast, 
shares of smaller firms tend to be held proportionately more by retail investors, who value liquidity 
less than institutional investors.3 
So far, little is known on what affects voluntary disclosure of relevant corporate information by 
managers.4 Generally, studies take information disclosure as an exogenous event, such as a major 
M&A deal or the decision to go public. A noticeable exception is the study by Maskara and 
                                                          
3
  Beuselinck, Deloof and Manigart (2008) find that private equity investors foster information disclosure in the 
companies they invest in. However, they do not examine the extent to which investor characteristics affect 
disclosure policy. 
4
 The literature in the area of accounting offers some insights, often using the decision to adopt specific 
reporting standards as a mean to study voluntary disclosure (see Verrecchia, 2001, for a detailed discussion). 
Other studies relate to disclosing financial accounting ratios (e.g., Skinner, 1994).  
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Mullineaux (2011), who shows that some corporations decide not to disclose information on 
syndicated loan approvals. Those that convey positive information to the market are more often 
disclosed. More recently, Chemmanur and Tian (2013) show that many corporations do not inform 
the market in advance on upcoming dividend cuts. Those who do are motivated by preparing the 
market about the bad news; however, this is mainly done by firms with temporary financial 
difficulties only. Relatedly, Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly and Ljungqvist (2013) show that voluntary 
information disclosure by managers affect liquidity of shares and thus the cost of equity capital. 
Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) find that under certain conditions, the gain resulting from lower cost 
of capital outweighs the potential disadvantage of disclosing information to competitors. 
To perform the analysis, we select from the VentureXpert database a random sample of 1000 CVC 
investments done by US public corporations during the time period 2002-2012 (out of a full sample 
of 2588 CVC investments). Using the Factiva database, we then manually collect information on 
which of these investments have been publicly announced and at which exact date. We find that 
about 2/3 of these investments have been publicly announced, while 1/3 not. Half of the 
announcements occur exactly on the day the agreement is signed. Two third are announced within 
an event window of [-1,+1] days of the agreement date. Interestingly, we observe little differences 
between the sample of announced investments and unannounced investments; the only statistically 
significant difference relates to seed investments, as such investments are less often present in the 
sub-sample of un-announced investments. This is consistent with prior discussion that these are 
more difficult to assess by ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐĂŶĚ “ƌŝƐŬŝĞƌ ?ƐŝŐŶĂůƐ. Similarly, we find little differences between 
the two sub-samples with regards to characteristics of the parent companies.  
We find that several characteristics of investments and parent companies allow understanding the 
motivations of parent companies to publicly announce their CVC investments. One crucial factor is 
the extent to which parent companies are subject to information asymmetry problem. Consistent 
with related theories, we find that companies facing severe information asymmetry problem have 
greater need to communicating any good news to the market. Next, larger parent companies 
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(measured in market capitalization) are more likely to make announcement. This is consistent with 
theoretical prediction of Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) that argue that larger firms benefit more 
from disclosing private information, since they rely more on market liquidity than smaller firms. We 
further document that parent companies that invest more in internal R&D or have larger capital 
expenditures (in $ amounts, not as a fraction of total assets) are more likely to announce. This is 
consistent with the idea that they may have competitive advantages and thus fear less competition.  
As extension, we examine the impact of syndicate size and structure on the disclosure probability. In 
many cases, the CVC parent company is not the sole investor. Since each investor may have its own 
incentives affecting their disclosure policy, we test our main predictions on the subsample of 
investments that are not syndicated; i.e., those where the parent company is the sole investor. 
Within this reduced sample of 122 deals, we find that the impact of information asymmetry, size and 
leverage of parent company is even larger than in the full sample. Moreover, the three effects are 
also present in the other subsample of syndicated investments, although weaker than what we 
observe in the non-syndicated subsample. In terms of syndicate structure, we find that information 
disclosure is more likely when an independent VC firm participates in the syndicate, in line with the 
idea that they need to communicate more as they depend on regular fundraising.  
We further investigate how the stock market reacts to these announcements. We find that CVC 
investment announcements lead to an increase in the stock price, with an average cumulative 
abnormal return of 2.0% over the [-2,+2] window after controlling for other relevant factors. The 
effect is however mostly driven by announcements done by parent companies that face severe 
information asymmetry problems. 
We contribute to several strands of literature. First, the theoretical literature on voluntary 
information disclosure derives different empirical predictions (see Section 2 for a discussion). To the 
best of our knowledge, many of them remain untested (notably Ferreira and Rezende, 2007, 
Fishman and Hegerty, 2003, and Perotti and von Thadden, 2005). We empirically test recent theories 
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in the context of CVC investment announcements. Second, we contribute to a better understanding 
on how investors perceive the disclosure of information. Given their rather small size compared to 
the parent companies, the value effect of these announcements are more likely to capture insights 
into the future strategic orientation of parent company. In contrast, most studies on M&As and 
corporate investments into larger companies focus on value generated by operating and financial 
efficiency (see Eckbo, 2010, for a comprehensive survey). Third, we complement the literature on 
the impact of CVC investments on startup firms. Existing studies typically focus on the divestment 
stage to measure impact, notably in connection with information asymmetry. For instance, 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that VC investments enable reduction of information asymmetry, 
which leads to lower underpricing at the IPO. More recently, Masulis and Nahata (2011) find that 
VC-backed companies are purchased at higher premium by acquirers, leading to announcement 
returns of 3% higher for the acquirer than for targets that are not VC-backed. We complement these 
studies, since some of the returns may already be incorporated in stock prices at time of 
investments. CVC investments offer a neat testing ground, since there we observe announcement 
effects. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents various theories of 
strategic information disclosure and testable hypotheses for empirical setting. Section 3 describes 
the data and offers summary statistics on the sample. Section 4 examines determinants of 
announcement decisions. Section 5 investigates stock price reactions following CVC investment 
announcements. Section 6 discusses robustness and extensions. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theories of Strategic Information Disclosure and Testable Hypotheses 
Several theories offer guidance as to why corporations may strategically decide to disclose 
voluntarily valuable information early on to the market. As underlying framework, these theories 
assume the presence of informational asymmetries in which managers know something outsiders 
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(e.g., equity investors) do not know. Signaling theory (Ross, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984) argues 
that managers may signal such information to the market, notably through financing and investment 
decisions. In this strand of literature however, decisions acting as signal is always observed.  
More recently, theoretical contributions on strategic information disclosure show that corporations 
may decide to disclose valuable information to affect product market outcome.5 They extend the 
traditional view on corporate disclosure that primarily focused on financial information as a way to 
reduce information asymmetry. Thus, it is not the decisions in isolation that acts as signal but also 
the fact that the financing or investments decision is announced. The more recent studies on the 
topic argue that information disclosure may be extended towards corporate strategy, which offers 
hint about future orientations of the corporation. For instance, Ferreira and Rezende (2007) present 
a theoretical framework where a corporation may strategically disclose information on innovation 
activities as a means to signal commitment to this specific project (empirical evidence is provided by 
Narayanan, Pinches, Kelm and Lander, 2000). Such an announcement may become a credible signal 
if reputation (e.g., in form of career concerns) is at stake in the event the corporation withdraws its 
commitment to the project later on. In this case, the corporation would not be able to credibly signal 
to the market anymore in the future. Therefore, corporations only announce innovation projects 
they are confident to pursue further, others are left unannounced. This may also lead partners of the 
corporation to do strategy-specific investments. In the context of syndicated loans, Maskara and 
Mullineaux (2011) find that corporations that are more affected by information asymmetry tend to 
announce their loans. They argue that such an announcement may lower information asymmetry. In 
our context of CVC investments, if any announcement also provides a signal for the overall quality of 
the other assets, the parent company may opt for announcing its CVC investments. This then leads 
ƚŽĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉĂƌĞŶƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐůĞǀĞůŽĨŝŶformation asymmetry and the probability 
of announcements.  
                                                          
5
 An early contribution to the product market channel is the work done by Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983). 
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Consistent with these arguments on information asymmetry, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
develop a theoretical framework in which they show that particularly large firms are more likely to 
disclose private information, since they benefit most due to the fact that their shares are held by 
institutional investors that trade larger blocks of shares for which the price impact is larger. The 
authors argue that retail investors, who hold proportionately more shares in smaller firms, are less 
affected by such liquidity problems. This leads to the testable hypothesis that the probability of 
observing public announcement is positively related to the size of the parent company.  
However, not all the CVC investments are likely to offer the same signal quality. Following the 
reasoning above, we expect later-stage investments to be more often announced than early-stage 
investments, where do-ability of projects is often uncertain. A similar empirical prediction can be 
derived from Fishman ĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƚƵĚǇƚŚĂƚ shows that projects that are more difficult to 
value by outsiders are less likely to be disclosed voluntarily. Given the significantly larger risk, early-
stage investments are more difficult to assess by outsiders. 
Other firm characteristics of the parent company may further impact the decision to announce CVC 
investments. Perotti and von Thadden (2005) argue that banks prefer a lower level of disclosure than 
equity holders, since banks can also monitor companies privately. This allows them to obtain the 
information privately. In contrast, equity holders rely on public announcements to obtain the 
information. Thus, corporations with higher leverage (thus, relying more on bank finance) may be 
less inclined to make announcements of CVC investments that can lead to information leakage to 
other relevant parties. tĞ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ĞǆƉĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĞŶƚ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ƌĂƚŝŽ ƚŽ ďĞ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ
related to the likelihood of having an announcement. 
In Section 4, we test the different predictions with respect to information asymmetry, stage of 
development, firm size, and leverage. To control for possibly other sources of company 
heterogeneity, we include in our multivariate analysis further company characteristics.  
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3. Data and Sample Statistics 
To examine our research question, we extracted from the VentureXpert database a random sample 
(i.e., sampling without replacement) of 1000 investments done by corporate-affiliated US venture 
capital firms during the time period 2002-2012 from a pool of 2588 CVC investments extracted from 
the database. To constitute our random sample, we only consider CVC firms that are held by public 
parent companies, thereby excluding private ones. We only consider We use VentureXpert to collect 
investment-level information on deal characteristics such as round amount, round number, number 
of investors participating in the considered round, investment stage of development and investment 
date (i.e., the date in which the contract is signed and reported in VentureXpert). We then manually 
search through the profiles of the CVC firms mentioned in VentureXpert and using other online 
sources to identify the ultimate parent company of the CVC firm or program. This search is needed, 
since VentureXpert reports the name of the CVC firm, but this is often a subsidiary of the parent 
company only.  
As a next step, we identify which of these investments were publicly announced and, if they were, 
on which day. To this end, we use the Factiva database to search each of our 1000 investments for 
whether it was announced either by the CVC firm (or program), parent company or start-up 
company by searching for their names in Factiva.  Our search window is six months prior to the 
investment date and three months post investment date. Overall, less than 3% of the cases we have 
identified involve multiple announcement dates. In the event of multiple announcement dates, we 
use the earliest date to the investment date as announcement date. We consider an investment is 
announced if any article in the Factiva database mentions the investment. We do not use any coded 
algorithm to search for announcements. Rather we read the news obtained on Factiva to search any 
announcement manually, as a way to minimize measurement errors. For deals that have not been 
publicly announced, we use the investment date as the event date for our event-study analysis. Note 
that CVC investments are generally not reported in SEC filings 8-K ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ  “ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇ ?, since 
parents companies are very large compared to the size of these investments. To ensure that this is 
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indeed the case, we manually checked 30% of our publicly announced CVC investments (based on 
Factiva) for information disclosed in the 8-K filings of the parent companies; not a single CVC 
investments is reported in the SEC filings. This supports the notion that these announcements are 
not forced but voluntary. 
Finally, to determine the likelihood of deal announcements and the performance as measured by 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), we use various parent company characteristics. We collect 
accounting data and stock prices information of the parent companies from Compustat and CRSP 
databases. This includes information on market value of the parent company (measured as the 
product of stock price and number of common shares outstanding), current assets, total assets, 
capital expenditure, cash, long term debt, current liabilities, net income, property plant and 
equipment, sales, working capital and research and development.  
To measure information asymmetry of the parent company, we create a composite index following 
Maskara and Mullineaux (2011). The index is constructed using six common information asymmetry 
benchmarks. The first is analyst forecast errors, measured as the absolute difference between 
analysts predicted earnings and actual earnings. The second is dispersion of analyst opinions, 
measured as the standard deviation of analysts ? forecasts of annual EPS in the last month prior to 
earning announcement. Analyst forecast errors and dispersion of analysts opinions are standardized 
by share price and collected from IBIS database. Third, is volatility of abnormal returns around the 
earnings announcement, measured as the standard deviation of 3-days abnormal returns around 
earnings in the five years preceding deal announcement.  Fourth is residual volatility measured as 
the standard deviation of market adjusted daily stock returns in the year of deal announcement. 
Fifth, is parent company age, measured as the number of years since the first firm observation in 
Compustat. Sixth and final is bid-ask spreads measured as the average ratio of the difference 
between the daily bid and ask closing prices to the midpoint of the bid and ask closing prices. This 
measure is also similar to Chung and Zhang (2009). The information asymmetry index is calculated 
by grouping firms in our sample into quartiles based on each of the six measures in the year a deal is 
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announced. Similar to Gomes and Philips (2010) and Maskara and Mullineaux (2011), we compute 
the information index as the average of the quartile ranking of a firm based on the six information 
measures. 
In addition to this index, we use market-to book-ratio of the parent company (denoted Market-to-
Book Ratio) as alternative measure of information asymmetry, since it captures the extent to which 
the parent company faces growth opportunities. Such opportunities are an important source of 
information asymmetry due to greater potential of insider information (see Gao, 2011, among many 
others). In our empirical analǇƐŝƐǁĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŵĂƌŬĞƚ-to-book ratio as well as its ratio 
adjusted for industry median market-to-book ratio (Excess Market-to-Book Ratio). These measures 
are calculated using CRSP and Compustat data. 
--- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics of our sample. Table 1 focuses on characteristics of CVC 
investments, while Table 2 on characteristics of parent companies. In both tables, we provide 
statistics for the full sample of 1000 observations (Panel A), the sample of announced CVC 
investments (Panel B), and the one of un-announced CVC investments (Panel C). Out of the 1000 
CVC investments considered in this study, we find that 635 investments were announced compared 
to 365 investments that were not announced.6  
The average round amount for the full sample is $16.50 million (median of $10.0 million), but there 
is significant variation. Also, the amount tends to be large due to the fact that a substantial part of 
the investments are in ventures at the expansion and later stage of development, where the 
amounts involved are a multiple of those at the early stage. Given that on average 4.849 investors in 
the syndicate, the average amount provided per investor is $3.40 million. We further observe great 
variation in the development stage at which these investments take place. 4.8% are seed-stage 
                                                          
6
 In Appendix 1, we show summary statistics on the CVC investment characteristics of the random sample of 
1000 observations relative to the population of 2588 observations in VentureXpert. We find no statistical 
difference between the two groups, which confirms that our sample is representative. 
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investments, 22.3% early-stage investments, 35.0% expansion stage investments, 26.8% later-stage 
investments and the rest investments in other stages. There is no meaningful difference in these 
values between announced and unannounced CVC investments. The only exception is the 
proportion of seed-stage investments that is higher for the sample of unannounced investments 
(7.1% versus 3.5%). 
--- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
In terms of parent company characteristics (Table 2), we also observe very little differences between 
corporations that announce investments and corporations that do not announce. We find significant 
differences for two of our main variables of interest, namely Information Asymmetry Index and 
Market-to-Book Ratio (as well as Excess Market-to-Book Ratio). These measures relate to the degree 
of information asymmetry of the parent company. The other statistically significant difference 
relates to working capital. The rationale is however unclear and not statistically significant anymore 
in the multivariate analysis. We observe no meaningful difference along the other variables of 
interest; i.e., R&D Expenses, CAPEX, and (Book) Leverage (defined as the ratio of long term debt over 
total asset). Furthermore, we find no substantial differences between the two subsamples with 
respect to industry classification. As reported in Appendix 2, we find that most of the parent 
companies are concentrated on the business equipments sector (based on the Fama-French 12 
industry classification of parent companies), regardless of whether the deals are announced (57% of 
the cases) or un-announced (48%). However, this difference is not statistically significant, nor 
differences for any other sector group reported.  
--- APPENDIX 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
Panel A in Table 2 further allows providing summary statistics on parent companies that manage a 
CVC program. Compared to a more representative sample of Compustat firms (Faulkender and 
Petersen, 2006), our sample of parent companies tend to be larger and hold more intangible assets.  
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4. Determinants of Announcement Decisions 
In this section, we investigate what affect announcement decision. In line with our theoretical 
discussion, we examine factors pertaining to the parent company, the investment itself and general 
market conditions. Table 3 provides Logit regression results, where the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the CVC investment was announced, and zero otherwise. 
Coefficients reported are marginal values so that they can be interpreted as changes in probabilities. 
In all our regressions, we include industry (based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification) and 
year dummies and use clustered standard errors at the year level. 
--- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
First, we find support for our prediction that parent companies with larger information asymmetry 
problems are more likely to announce their investments. This is consistent with the signaling story of 
Ferreira and Rezende (2007) in that it serves as a commitment devise and enables a reduction of the 
information asymmetry (consistent with finding of Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011, on syndicated 
loans). The effect is economically meaningful: a one-standard deviation increase in the Information 
Asymmetry Index leads to an increase by 7.3% (= 0.684 x 0.1068) in the probability of having the CVC 
investments being announced. Similarly, our alternative measure of information asymmetry, 
Market-to-Book Ratio, shows the same sign and is statistically significant. These are typically the 
companies for which early investments are crucial, as they rely more on innovation to sustain their 
future growth. Our results also indicate that parent companies with strongest growth opportunities 
within their industry sector (the variable Excess Market-to-Book) are more likely to announce their 
deals. This implies that not only higher growth opportunities increase the likelihood of announcing 
CVC investments but also when the parent company enjoys higher growth opportunities than 
industry average. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard deviation increase in the 
variable Excess Market-to-Book Ratio leads to a 9.3% (= 1.691 x 0.0551) increase in the likelihood of 
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observing an announcement of the CVC investment. For Market-to-Book Ratio, the corresponding 
increase is even more remarkable; i.e., a 32.7% (= 3.59 x 0.091) increase in the probability of 
announcing. 
Second, we find that larger corporations (measured by market capitalization of equity) are more 
likely to publicly announce their CVC investments. This finding is in line with the prediction of 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), who argue that larger firms have greater incentives to disclose such 
price-relevant information due to their greater reliance on institutional investors as shareholders 
(for which liquidity issues are more important than for smaller shareholders). Moreover, we find a 
positive link for corporations that spend more extensively in internal R&D and make larger capital 
expenditures.7 In unreported results, we further find that internal R&D and capital expenditures only 
affect announcement decision when considering dollar amounts; results disappear if scaled by total 
assets. This indicates a scale effect rather than relative importance of these expenses. The finding 
that larger firms are more likely to announce their CVC investments is consistent that they have a 
greater need to do so (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) and that they are more closely covered by 
analysts, increasing the chances to observe a public announcement.  
Third, leverage negatively impacts the probability of having the investment announced. Perotti and 
von Thadden (2005) argue that debt-financed firms need less to disclose information, since banks 
can obtain this information themselves in the course of their monitoring activities. Thus, announcing 
the investment would not affect their cost of debt financing. Our results support this prediction. 
Forth, seed-stage investments are less likely to be announced. This is consistent with our theoretical 
discussion above that these investments are more difficult to value or understand their ultimate 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌĞŶƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ.  The impact is economically important, 
                                                          
7
 The fact that announcements are more likely for larger corporations contradicts the suspicion that such 
investments must be announced for ďĞŝŶŐ “ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ?as argued by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) in 
their Hypothesis 2. This would lead to a purely mechanical effect. An important difference with our study is 
that Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) examine syndicated loans that involve much larger amounts, often 
ranging well over $250 million. The material impact on capital structure is likely to be more substantial than 
for CVC investments in start-up companies (where the impact on the balance sheet is rather marginal). 
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since seed-stage investments have a probability of being announced that is lower by 17.7% 
compared to the base group (that is the group of Other Stages) in Model I. Taken in isolation (i.e., 
when only including the dummy Seed Stage, while excluding all the other stage dummies), the 
reduction in probability of announcement for seed-stage investments is even stronger, namely 
19.89% (result not reported in Table 3). Early-stage, the next stage of development, is however not 
significant, just like all the other development stages. 
Finally, we show in Model VI results when including all the main explanatory variables inside a single 
specification. Note that the three variables of size (market value, R&D and CAPEX) are strongly 
correlated; this may explain why their significance level goes down when estimated jointly. 
However, the effect of information asymmetry remains significant. Also, its economic significance 
(i.e., the magnitude of the coefficient, since we report marginal effects) remains largely unaffected. 
Our control variables are generally not significant. If they are statistically significant, it only occurs 
for some of the specifications but not across all of them. Thus, results for our control variables do 
not appear robust. However, their inclusion allows showing robustness of our main factors. 
 
5. The Impact of Deal Syndication and Organizational Structure of CVC Program 
In this section, we explore further potential factors that may impact the propensity of CVC programs 
to disclose publicly their investments. In Section 5.1, we explicitly control for the fact that most 
investments are syndicated and that other syndicate members may have their own incentives to 
disclose information. In Section 5.2, we examine whether the organizational structure of the CVC 
program affects announcement decisions, since externally managed programs may have other 
motivations than internally management ones to make announcements. 
 
5.1 The Impact of Syndicate Size and Structure  
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In many cases, the amount invested is provided by a set of investors and not only the parent 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ s ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŝŶ ŽƵƌ ƐĂŵƉůĞ ? Ɛ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ŝŶ dĂďůĞ  ? ? ƚŚĞ ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ
number of investors in our sample is 4.849, thus on average 3.849 investors other than the CVC 
program of the parent company. These investors may face other incentives in terms of information 
disclosure, especially if these are independent VC firms. In this section, we examine whether the size 
and structure of the syndicate impacts the probability of having a CVC investment announced. 
--- TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE --- 
Since it is enough that at least one investor decides to disclose, one might expect the probability to 
increase in the syndicate size. We test this prediction by performing our analysis on two separate 
subsamples, one for investments that only involve the ƉĂƌĞŶƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐsƉƌŽŐƌĂŵĂŶĚŽŶĞĨŽƌ
the syndicated investments. We expect our predictions discussed in Section 2 to be most relevant in 
the second subsample. Results are reported in Table 4. Overall, 122 investments from our sample 
are not syndicated, while 878 are syndicated. We find that results are generally stronger for the 
subsample of non-syndicated investments (for the leverage effect in Panel B and the size effect in 
Panel C), which offers support to our predictions. In any case, results remain significant. Still, these 
estimations should be considered with caution since syndicate size may itself be affected by the 
disclosure policy of the parent company. Indeed, a firm that does not want to disclose at all its CVC 
investments may decide not to syndicate in the first place. Therefore, results reported in Table 4 
should be viewed as complementary to earlier results. 
--- TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE --- 
Next, we examine the impact of the structure of syndicates, by controlling for the possible 
heterogeneity in the syndicate members. Most of the venture capital is provided by independent VC 
firms that are not affiliated to a specific corporation or financial institution. These different types of 
VC players are likely to have different incentives schemes in terms of information disclosure policy. 
For instance, Gompers (1996) shows ƚŚĂƚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚsĨŝƌŵƐĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ “ŐƌĂŶĚƐƚĂŶĚ ? at times 
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they need to raise new funds. This is likely to affect also the way the amount of information they 
disclose to the market on their current investments. To capture specificities of independent VC 
firms, we construct a variable that corresponds to the fraction of independent VC firms participating 
in the syndicate. In the VentureXpert database, they are categorized as fund type  “WZ/s ? ?We then 
include this additional variable in our regressions, which we denote Independent VC Participating. 
Based on the discussion above, we expect this variable to have a positive effect on the likelihood ot 
having an announcement. Results are reported in Table 5. Our main results on the impact of 
information asymmetry, reliance on debt finance and size remain unchanged. However, we find that 
the presence of independent VC firms positively affects the disclosure probability. This is consistent 
with the idea that they have their own disclosure policy and may find it worthwhile to communicate 
on their investments, potentially due to its impact of fundraising.  
 
5.2 The Impact of the Organizational Structure of CVC Programs  
Another, related issue is the structure of the CVC program itself. While some programs are 
structured as internal organization, others are separate in form of a distinct legal identity (even 
though it is controlled by the parent company, since it will generally be a fully-owned subsidiary). In 
other words, some CVC programs are structured as internal programs, others externally managed. 
The choice of organizational structure could impact the likelihood of making an announcement. In 
particular, one could expect that externally managed programs are more likely to make public 
announcements, in order to show presence and attract interest. As argued by Gompers and Lerner 
(1998), CVC programs depend on the continued interest of top management and thus need to be 
more visible in order to secure long-ƚĞƌŵ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĞŶƚ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ. This is 
particular important when the corporate link is more distant, as it is the case for externally managed 
programs. Admittedly, the categorization of internal versus external program is difficult to realize. 
However, one simple way to perform this categorization is by comparing the name of the CVC 
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program in the VentureXpert database with the name of the parent company. In case of a separate 
legal entity (thus, an external program rather than an internal business department), one expect two 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŶĂŵĞƐ ? KƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ? ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ŝƐ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŽďĞ ĂŶ  “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ? ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ? ĂƐ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ
structured as a separate legal entity. In Table 6, we adopt this categorization and offer an analysis of 
the impact of the organizational structure of CVC programs on the disclosure probability. The 
constructed dummy variable is denoted External CVC. We find that externally managed programs 
lead to more announcements. This is consistent with the idea that such programs have greater 
incentives to attract attention of the market and the parent company, as its relationship with top 
management is not as immediate as for internally managed programs. 
--- TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE --- 
Relatedly, the incentives to disclose may be driven by the degree of organizational complexity of the 
parent company. In less hierarchical structures, CVC managers can more easily communicate in an 
informal way to the management of the parent company. In more hierarchical structures however, 
informal communication may be more difficult. To shed light into this specific channel, we explore 
whether information disclosure is more likely when the parent companies has a more hierarchical 
organization. As proxy, we use the number of industries it is active by counting the number of 
industries reported in the COMPUSTAT Segment database. We consider companies that are active in 
more industries  ?ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ  “STYPE = BUSSEG ? ?to be more likely to have more 
complex organizational structures. As second proxy, we use the same database to assess whether 
parent companies are selling ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ  ?ƵƐŝŶŐ  ?STYPE = GEOSEG “ ?. In unreported results, we 
find that information disclosure on the CVC investment is more likely when the parent company is 
more diversified (more industry segments) and operates internationally. However, the result is only 
statistically significant for industry segments (at 5% level). Combined with the previous results, these 
findings strengthen the notion that announcements are more likely when communication with the 
parent company is less formal due to its organizational complexity. 
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6. Stock Price Reactions to CVC Investment Announcements 
In this section, we examine whether CVC investments generate stock market reactions when they 
are announced. We rely on the CAR/AR methodology, using the market model as reference for 
calculating abnormal returns (following Brown and Warner, 1985). This methodology is widely used 
in event-studies, which is also the empirical framework we use in the section. Following the 
literature (Brown and Warner, 1985, Gao, 2009, Masulis and Nahata, 2011, and others), we use the 
[-10,+10] window for calculating CAR but also perform robustness checks with other windows. 
Again, we use year-level clustered standard error in the regressions. The parameters of the market 
model are estimated over a 100 days window ending 16 trading days before the announcement day. 
The S&P 500 value weighted Index is used as benchmark of the market portfolio. We require at least 
50 daily stock returns in the estimation period to estimate parameters that are used to calculate 
CAR/AR. The fact that our estimation period ends 16 days before the announcement day is to avoid 
bias in the parameters estimations due to changes in firm characteristics around the deal 
announcement day.  This approach is consistent with the previous studies that follow a well 
established methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
--- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
Figure 1 presents a histogram of our sample.8 It indicates that 314 out of the 635 publicly announced 
investments are announced at the investment date reported in VentureXpert. Taking a window of [-
1,+1] days difference between the announcement day and the investment date of VentureXpert, we 
find 64.4% of our announced sample. Only very few are announced before (those with positive 
values on the x-axis), but many later (negative values). 
                                                          
8
 The fact that about half are announced at the same time as the investment date in VentureXpert can also be 
attributed (at least in part) to the way information is collected for the construction of the VentureXpert 
database. Indeed, some of the information stems from public announcements. Presumably, VentureXpert 
then reports the announcement date as the investment date. However, this does not affect our analysis, 
since we are primarily interested in the announcement date and not the investment date reported by 
VentureXpert. 
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--- FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
Figure 2 shows the ARs during the window of [-10,+10] days for announced and unannounced CVC 
investments. For unannounced investments, we use the contract date as event date (T = 0). This 
approach is motivated by our earlier findings that 2/3 of the deals that are announced are 
announced within a narrow window of [-1,+1] days (see Figure 1). Results are also reported in Panel 
A of Table 7 for both subsamples. Overall, we find a positive stock price reaction at date of 
announcement, with an AR of 2.12% on average (statistically significant at 1%). In contrast, the 
average AR for the subsample of unannounced investments is 0.52%. The difference in average AR 
between the two subsamples is statistically significant at 1% level. In Panel B of Table 7, we report 
summary statistics on CARs for different windows. The average [-2,+2] CAR for the subsample of 
announced investments is 2.63%, and for the subsample of unannounced investments -0.57%. The 
difference is statistically significant at 1% level. This indicates that parent companies who announce 
their CVC investments benefit from these announcements. As evidenced in the previous section 
however, the sample of announced investments is not random but the result of strategic choices of 
parent companies. 
--- TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE --- 
To obtain a more insightful picture of these differences, we run multivariate regressions on CARs for 
the [-10,+10] window. This analysis helps understanding which factors affect CARs of CVC 
investments announcements. Estimation results based on Heckman selection 2SLS are provided in 
Table 8. The selection equation (lower panel) estimates the probability of deal announcement (Logit 
regressions), while the outcome equation (upper panel) estimates the determinants of cumulative 
abnormal returns for the [-10,+10] window. The selection equation follows the base specification 
(Model I) in Table 3.   
--- TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE --- 
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The Wald test of exogeneity yields a value of Chi-squared of 3.12, which means a p-value of 0.0784. 
This indicates that the announcements are endogenous, and thus justifies the use of two-stage 
model. This finding is important, since studies on announcement effects typically assume 
exogeneity. In the case of CVC investments, we find this is not true. 
--- TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE --- 
Table 9 shows robustness along other windows of analysis. It confirms robustness of our results for 
shorter windows: [-2,+2], [-3,+3] and [-4,+2]. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the announcement effects of CVC investments by controlling explicitly for the 
endogenous nature of the decision to announce such investments. CVC investments by large 
corporations appear a valuable setting for testing different theories of voluntary information 
disclosure ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐŝƐŶŽƚĂ “ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĞǀĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽ
compulsory reporting at the SEC. Moreover, these investments are likely to offer insights into 
strategic re-orientation of parent companies due to their highly innovative nature. 
Consistent with several empirical predictions of these theories, we find that CVC investments are 
more likely to be publicly announced if the parent company of the CVC program exhibits larger 
degrees of information asymmetry and growth opportunities, is larger and has greater leverage. 
Moreover, investments that are still at the seed stage are less likely to be disclosed.  
More generally, our results stress the endogenous nature of public announcements by listed 
companies, making it a strategic decision. tŚŝůĞůŝƐƚĞĚĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽƌĞƉŽƌƚ “ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů
ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶƐďǇĨŝůŝŶŐĂŶ ?-K document at the SEC, other corporate decisions do not 
ŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ?^ƚŝůů ?ƚŚĞǇŵĂǇǀĞŚŝĐůĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?
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Figure 1: Timing of CVC Investment Announcements 
This figure reports the number of announcements (y-axis) in our sample of 635 publicly 
announced CVC investments according to the timing of announcement. The x-axis is the 
difference in days between announcement date and investment date (i.e., the investment date 
minus announcement date, leading to a negative value when the announcement is made after 
the investment date). For the investment date, we take the date as reported in VentureXpert 
database. We consider an investment to be announced if any news was found in Factiva. Out 
of our sample of 635 announced investments, this figure shows that 314 investments are 
announced on the same day as the investment date reported in VentureXpert, while 132 
investments are announced 7 days or more after the investment date. 
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Figure 2: Average Abnormal Returns for CVC Investments 
This figure shows the average abnormal returns for announced and unannounced deals. The average 
abnormal returns are computed using market model over the [-10,+10] window around the 
announcement date (event). Announcement dates are based on the performed Factiva searches. For 
deals that are not announced on Factiva, we use investment round date as the event date (as 
reported in VentureXpert). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of CVC Investments 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of CVC investment characteristics.  Panel A shows the 
statistics for the random sample of 1000 investments. Panel B shows the statistics for the 
announced investments, and Panel C for the un-announced investments. The variable Round 
Amount reports the size of the total amount (in $ thousands) invested in the given financing 
round. Round Number is the sequence of the financing round. Number of Investors is the number 
of investors involved in the given round financing. Seed Stage, Early Stage, Expansion Stage, Later 
Stage and Other Stages are dummy variables taking a value of one for each corresponding 
financing stage, and zero otherwise. Panel C also provides significance level of difference in 
means tests between values from Panels B and C. Significance levels: ***,**,* indicates 1% 5% 
and 10% respectively (n.s. for > 10%). 
Panel A: Full sample Characteristics of CVC Investments 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Round Amount 16495.53 10000 25976.63 1.0000 460000 
Round Number 3.4181 3.0000 2.4251 1.0000 20.0000 
Number of Investors 4.8492 4.0000 3.3900 1.0000 26.0000 
Seed Stage 0.0481 0.0000 0.2141 0.0000 1.0000 
Early Stage 0.2230 0.0000 0.4171 0.0000 1.0000 
Expansion Stage 0.3500 0.0000 0.4770 0.0000 1.0000 
Later Stage 0.2681 0.0000 0.4432 0.0000 1.0000 
Other Stages 0.1090 0.0000 0.3121 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of observations 1000         
Panel B: Announced Investments 
     Round Amount 17526.7 10210.51 28116.10 1.1671 460000 
Round Number 3.4571 3.0000 2.4791 1.0000 14.0000 
Number of Investors 4.8301 4.0000 3.5681 1.0000 26.0000 
Seed Stage 0.0351 0.0000 0.1832 0.0000 1.0000 
Early Stage 0.2140 0.0000 0.4111 0.0000 1.0000 
Expansion Stage 0.3570 0.0000 0.4802 0.0000 1.0000 
Later Stage 0.2881 0.0000 0.4530 0.0000 1.0000 
Other Stages 0.1040 0.0000 0.3052 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of observations 635 
    
Panel C: Un-announced Investments 
     Round Amount 14790.41n.s. 9413.01 21924.80 1.0000 21323 
Round Number 3.3521n.s. 3.0000 2.3280 1.0000 20.0000 
Number of Investors 4.8821n.s. 4.0000 3.0590 1.0000 26.0000 
Seed Stage 0.0710** 0.0000 0.2580 0.0000 1.0000 
Early Stage 0.2390n.s. 0.0000 0.4271 0.0000 1.0000 
Expansion Stage 0.3380n.s. 0.0000 0.4741 0.0000 1.0000 
Later Stage 0.2340n.s. 0.0000 0.4240 0.0000 1.0000 
Other Stages 0.1180n.s. 0.0000 0.3230 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of observations 365 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Parent Companies 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of parent company characteristics.  Panel A shows the 
statistics for the full sample, Panel B for the announced CVC investments and Panel C for the un-
announced CVC investments. Market value is market value of the CVC parent company; i.e., stock 
price at the end of the calendar year (one year prior to the investment) multiplied by number of 
shares outstanding. Current Assets, Total Assets, Leverage, CAPEX (capital expenditure), Cash, Long-
Term Debt, Current liability, Net Income, PPE (i.e., Property, Plant and Equipment - Net), Sales, 
Working Capital, R&D Expenses are all accounting variables for the parent company. Current Assets, 
CAPEX, Cash, Current Liabilities, PPE and R&D Expenses are scaled by Total Assets. Information 
Asymmetry Index is an index measuring the level of information asymmetry in the parent company; 
more details are provided in Section 3. The index is computed the same way as in Maskara and 
Mullineaux (2011). Market-to-Book Ratio is the market-to-book ratio of the parent company. Excess 
Market-to-Book Ratio is the value of Market-to-Book Ratio in excess of industry median market-to-
book ratio. All Compustat variables are measured in the year prior to the investment date. Panel B 
also provides significance level of difference in means tests between values from Panels B and C. 
Significance levels: ***,**,* indicates 1% 5% and 10% respectively (n.s. for > 10%). 
Panel A: Full sample Characteristics of Parent Companies 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Market Value (in $ thousands) 100594.40 81538.92 87143.54 13.7111 476115.50 
Current Assets / Total Assets 0.4421 0.4422 0.1811 0.0311 0.9810 
Total Assets (in $ thousands) 74306.47 46784.00 175065.00 9.58 3211484.00 
CAPEX / Total Assets 0.0600 0.0400 0.0410 0.0000 0.3200 
Cash / Total Assets 0.1201 0.1000 0.0910 0.0000 0.8210 
Leverage 0.1250 0.0570 0.1411 0.0000 0.9810 
Long-Term Debt (in $ thousands) 16832.36 2049.00 106029.90 0.00 3038147.00 
Current liabilities / Total Assets 0.2112 0.1811 0.1001 0.0300 0.6910 
Net Income 4308.73 3160.00 5597.27 -38732.00 104821.00 
PPE / Total Assets 0.2201 0.1801 0.1301 0.0000 0.8911 
Sales 34087.86 30141.00 34289.02 0.0000 255112.00 
Working Capital 8883.96 7311.85 9235.60 -6528.00 43845.00 
R&D Expenses / Total Assets 0.0801 0.0901 0.0512 0.0000 0.6701 
Information Asymmetry Index 2.5573 2.2920 0.6840 1.0631 5.1012 
Excess Market-to-Book Ratio 1.6862 1.5722 1.6911 -1.0160 7.5160 
Market-to-Book Ratio 3.5901 3.3601 1.9810 0.9800 11.9112 
Number of observations 1000 
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Table 2 continue 
Panel B: Announced deals 
     Market Value (in $ thousands) 101754.50n.s. 85563.13 84682.34 18.9810 476115.50 
Current Assets / Total Assets 0.4401n.s. 0.4311 0.1801 0.0301 0.9810 
Total Assets (in $ thousands) 80344.98n.s. 47143.00 202470.20 9.5801 3211484.00 
CAPEX / Total Assets 0.0601n.s. 0.0510 0.0401 0.0000 0.3210 
Cash / Total Assets 0.1201n.s. 0.1011 0.0911 0.0000 0.8201 
Leverage 0.1010** 0.0531 0.1180 0.0000 0.9401 
Long-Term Debt (in $ thousands) 19659.83n.s. 2049.00 129621.20 0.0000 3038147.00 
Current liabilities / Total Assets 0.2010n.s. 0.1701 0.1001 0.0302 0.5601 
Net Income 4512.91n.s. 3247.00 5980.99 -16855.00 104821.00 
PPE / Total Assets 0.2210n.s. 0.1901 0.1302 0.0000 0.8911 
Sales 35225.85n.s. 30146.00 34074.99 0.0000 195341.00 
Working Capital 9714.80** 8260.34 9801.81 -6528.00 43845.00 
R&D Expenses / Total Assets 0.0831n.s. 0.0921 0.0501 0.0000 0.6721 
Information Asymmetry Index 2.6390** 2.3792 0.6671 1.0632 5.1012 
Excess Market-to-Book Ratio 1.8430** 1.7721 1.6330 -0.8161 7.5160 
Market-to-Book Ratio 4.290** 4.1211 1.6901 2.0000 11.5300 
Independent VC 0.4666** 0.5000 0.2769 0.0000 0.8888 
External CVC 0.03571 0.0000 0.1858 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of observations 635 
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Panel C: Un-announced deals 
     Market Value (in $ thousands) 98481.43 72753.59 91565.36 13.71 476115.50 
Current Assets / Total Assets 0.4310 0.4400 0.1901 0.0311 0.8921 
Total Assets (in $ thousands) 63542.92 44224.00 109945.20 26.09 795337.00 
CAPEX / Total Assets 0.0500 0.0411 0.0401 0.0001 0.1701 
Cash / Total Assets 0.1212 0.1001 0.0901 0.0001 0.4601 
Leverage 0.1340 0.0851 0.1300 0.0000 0.9901 
Long-Term Debt (in $ thousands) 11778.15 2022.00 35838.81 0.0000 360681.00 
Current liabilities / Total Assets 0.2101 0.1810 0.1000 0.0611 0.6901 
Net Income 3944.77 3117.00 4825.09 -38732.00 23931.00 
PPE / Total Assets 0.2202 0.1801 0.1311 0.0010 0.6810 
Sales 32059.40 29321.00 34622.82 8.7212 255112.00 
Working Capital 7391.52 6536.74 7917.90 -5223.00 43845.00 
R&D Expenses / Total Assets 0.0800 0.0901 0.0510 0.0001 0.2911 
Information Asymmetry Index 2.4151 2.2512 0.6901 1.1451 4.3350 
Excess Market-to-Book Ratio 1.4122 1.3970 1.7571 -1.0161 4.3810 
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.3201 1.9401 1.8401 0.0702 9.0601 
Independent VC 0.4244 0.5000 0.2527 0.0000 0.8750 
External CVC 0.0315 0.0000 0.1749 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of observations 365         
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Table 3:  Shows the results of Logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy taking a value of one if CVC or parent company announced the deal and 0 otherwise. 
Information Asymmetry Index is an index measuring the level of information asymmetry in CVC parent company. The index is computed the same way as in Maskara and 
Mullineaux (2010). Excess Market-to-Book Ratio is the market to book ratio of the CVC parent company in excess of industry median market to book ratio. Market to book ratio is 
the market to book ratio of CVC parent company. Leverage is measured as long term debt divided by total asset. ln(Market Value) is the logarithm of market value of the CVC 
parent company. ln(R&D Expenses) is the logarithm of research and development expenses.  ln(CAPEX) is the logarithm of capital expenditure expenses. ln(Long-Term Debt) is the 
logarithm of long term debt. Negative NI is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the parent company has a negative net income and zero otherwise. Sales Growth is a change 
in sales for the parent company. Seed Stage, Early Stage, Expansion Stage and Later Stage are dummies. All Compustat variables are measured in a year prior to the 
announcement. Other Stages is used as the base dummy in the regression. The coefficients reported are marginal effects. We control for industry and year effects. Significance 
levels: ***,**,* indicates 1% 5% and 10% respectively.  
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII 
  Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value 
Information Asymmetry Index 0.1068*** (0.0000) 
            
0.0601** (0.0250) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
  
0.0911*** (0.0000) 
          
0.3932*** (0.0000) 
Excess Market-to-Book Ratio 
    
0.0551** (0.0120) 
        
0.0270*** (0.0010) 
ln(Market Value) 
      
0.0152*** (0.0040) 
      
0.3270 (0.1540) 
ln(R&D Expenses) 
        
0.0124** (0.0150) 
    
0.3100 (0.7120) 
ln(CAPEX) 
          
0.0155* (0.0900) 
  
0.0210 (0.2780) 
Leverage 
            
-0.0450*** (0.0000) -0.4681*** (0.0000) 
ln(Long -Term Debt) -0.0009 (0.8500) 0.0210*** (0.0010) 0.0117** (0.0380) 0.0013 (0.8790) 0.0025 (0.7370) -0.0035 (0.9510) 
  
0.4961*** (0.0000) 
Negative NI -0.0364 (0.5600) -0.1061* (0.0550) -0.0885* (0.0990) -0.1013* (0.0980) -0.0655 (0.2280) -0.0747 (0.3640) -0.0482 (0.3500) -0.0540 (0.4880) 
Sales Growth 0.0004 (0.1450) 0.001*** (0.0010) 0.0004 (0.1970) 0.0005* (0.0980) 0.0005 (0.1200) 0.0005 (0.1260) 0.0005* (0.0970) 0.0000 (0.5840) 
Seed Stage -0.1770** (0.0300) -0.1350 (0.1600) -0.1728** (0.0280) -0.1487* (0.0770) -0.1613* (0.0760) -0.2435** (0.0370) -0.2441** (0.0130) -0.046* (0.0810) 
Early Stage -0.0261 (0.2230) -0.0020 (0.9690) -0.0202 (0.1800) 0.0099 (0.5140) 0.0010 (0.2970) -0.0891 (0.2550) -0.0539 (0.4530) 0.0190 (0.7280) 
Expansion Stage 0.0224 (0.5090) 0.0400 (0.4230) 0.0193 (0.4030) 0.0457 (0.8230) 0.0416 (0.6170) -0.0421 (0.5420) 0.0031 (0.4220) 0.0100 (0.8490) 
Later Stage 0.0648 (0.9220) 0.0830 (0.1300) 0.0632 (0.8050) 0.0763 (0.8870) 0.0764 (0.9740) -0.0002 (0.9300) 0.0448 (0.2570) 0.0260 (0.6390) 
Constant -0.4781 (0.7770) -0.2801* (0.0810) 0.1793 (0.1910) -0.2907 (0.9290) 0.3333 (0.1070) 0.7868* (0.0590) 0.2090* (0.0640) 0.2660* (0.0780) 
                 Likelihood Ratio -613.32 
 
-540.79 
 
-612.32 
 
-580.53 
 
-621.2 
 
-619.07 
 
-388.65 
 
-560.79 
 Number of observations 1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   
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Table 4: The Impact of Syndicate Size on Disclosure 
This table shows results of Logit regressions on the probability of announcement separately for the 
subsamples of investments that are not syndicated (i.e., there is only one investor, which is the 
ƉĂƌĞŶƚ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ s ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ƐǇŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ? Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ŽŶĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ
investor participated in the financing round). Panel A shows the results of information asymmetry, 
Panel B the results of leverage and Panel C the results of size effect. The dependent variable is a 
dummy taking a value of one if the parent company announced the CVC investment, and 0 
otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 3. Other Stages is used as the base dummy in the 
regression. The coefficients reported are marginal effects. We control for industry and year effects. 
Significance levels: ***,**,* indicates 1% 5% and 10% respectively. 
Panel A: Information asymmetry  Model I: No syndicated investments   Model II: Syndicated investments only 
  Coefficient P-value   Coefficient P-value 
Information Asymmetry Index 0.1121** (0.0100) 
 
0.1390*** (0.0000) 
ln(Long-Term Debt) -0.0165 (0.1870) 
 
-0.0006 (0.9230) 
Negative NI 0.0631 (0.3350) 
 
-0.0391 (0.6010) 
Sales Growth 0.3748** (0.0220) 
 
0.0005 (0.1330) 
Seed Stage -0.4185** (0.0150) 
 
-0.1186 (0.2800) 
Early Stage -0.2362* (0.0890) 
 
-0.0325 (0.4710) 
Expansion Stage -0.1379 (0.2350) 
 
0.0749 (0.1090) 
Later Stage 0.1142 (0.4300) 
 
0.1121 (0.1660) 
Constant 0.2271 (0.8340) 
 
-1.0959** (0.0450) 
Number of observations 122 
 
  878 
 
Panel B: Leverage 
  
 
  
Leverage -0.5095** (0.0130) 
 
-0.3329*** (0.0010) 
Negative NI 0.0004 (0.9970) 
 
-0.0434 (0.5190) 
Sales Growth 0.3678** (0.0310) 
 
0.0005* (0.0960) 
Seed Stage -0.4560*** (0.0050) 
 
-0.1671 (0.1580) 
Early Stage -0.2126 (0.1420) 
 
0.0121 (0.7650) 
Expansion Stage -0.1433 (0.2090) 
 
0.0627 (0.2410) 
Later Stage 0.0909 (0.5640) 
 
0.0984* (0.0590) 
Constant 3.6871*** (0.0010) 
 
1.4269*** (0.0010) 
Number of observations 122 
 
  878 
 
Panel C: Size 
     
ln(Market Value) 0.0415*** (0.0030) 
 
0.0209*** (0.0000) 
ln(Long-Term Debt) -0.0180 (0.2370) 
 
0.0029 (0.6950) 
Negative NI -0.0200 (0.8480) 
 
-0.1235* (0.0920) 
Sales Growth 0.3097* (0.0750) 
 
0.0006* (0.0740) 
Seed Stage -0.4351** (0.0160) 
 
-0.0862 (0.4540) 
Early Stage -0.1756 (0.2560) 
 
0.0599 (0.2010) 
Expansion Stage -0.1577 (0.2270) 
 
0.1046 (0.1660) 
Later Stage 0.0770 (0.6710) 
 
0.1286** (0.0270) 
Constant -1.5086 (0.1940) 
 
-0.9623* (0.0540) 
Number of observations 122 
 
  878 
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Table 5: The Impact of Independent VC Participating in the Syndicate 
This table shows results of Logit regressions on the probability of announcement when independent 
VCs are participating in the syndicate. The dependent variable is a dummy taking a value of one if the 
parent company announced the CVC investment and 0 otherwise. Independent VC Participating is 
the percentage of private VCs in the syndicate. All other variables are defined in Table 3. Other 
Stages is used as the base dummy in the regression. The coefficients reported are marginal effects. 
We control for industry and year effects. Significance levels: ***,**,* indicates 1% 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Model I 
 
Model II  Model III 
  Coefficient P-value   Coefficient P-value 
 
Coefficient P-value 
Information Asymmetry Index 0.1208*** (0.0000) 
   
   
Size 
   
0.0181** (0.002)    
Leverage 
     
 -0.0994*** (0.0000) 
Independent VC Participating 0.1455** (0.0180) 
 
0.1523** (0.0020)  0.1489** (0.0180) 
ln(Long-Term Debt) -0.0002 (0.9740) 
 
0.0023 (0.7600)    
Negative NI -0.0249 (0.6940) 
 
-0.1134* (0.0600)  -0.0560 (0.3290) 
Sales Growth 0.0002** (0.0029) 
 
-0.0005** (0.0340)  0.0001 (0.5860) 
Seed Stage -0.1926* (0.0720) 
 
-0.1558 (0.1620)  -0.3381** (0.0050) 
Early Stage -0.0488 (0.4640) 
 
-0.0070 (0.8910)  -0.1332 (0.1210) 
Expansion Stage -0.0114 (0.6030) 
 
0.0167 (0.7710)  -0.0672 (0.4740) 
Later Stage 0.0346 (0.2550) 
 
0.0475 (0.4580)  -0.0197 (0.8300) 
Constant -0.8657* (0.0580) 
 
-0.6866 (0.1620)  0.3560* (0.0550) 
Likelihood Ratio -613.68 
  
-573.91 
 
 -519.97  
Number of observations 999 
  
999 
 
 999  
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Table 6: The Impact of Syndicate Structure on Disclosure  
This table shows results of Logit regressions on the probability of announcement when the VC is 
external managed. The dependent variable is a dummy taking a value of one if the parent company 
announced the CVC investment, and 0 otherwise. External CVC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 
if the CVC program is structured as a separate legal entity (subsidiary), and 0 otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Table 3. Other Stages is used as the base dummy in the regression. The 
coefficients reported are marginal effects. We control for industry and year effects. Significance levels: 
***,**,* indicates 1% 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model I 
 
Model II  Model III 
  Coefficient P-value   Coefficient P-value 
 
Coefficient P-value 
Information Asymmetry Index 0.1129*** (0.0000) 
   
   
ln(Market Value) 
   
0.0162** (0.0010)    
Leverage 
     
 -0.0956*** (0.0000) 
External CVC 0.0786** (0.0180) 
 
0.0555* (0.0920)  0.0636** (0.0210) 
ln(Long-Term Debt) -0.0014 (0.8240) 
 
0.0012** (0.0010)    
Negative NI -0.0571 (0.3340) 
 
-0.1177 (0.8690)  -0.0719 (0.1390) 
Sales Growth 0.0005 (0.1340) 
 
0.0005** (0.0420)  0.0005* (0.0960) 
Seed Stage -0.1877** (0.0490) 
 
-0.1550* (0.0760)  -0.3343** (0.0040) 
Early Stage -0.0311 (0.4640) 
 
0.0072 (0.1260)  -0.1091 (0.1880) 
Expansion Stage 0.0244 (0.6030) 
 
0.0475 (0.8760)  -0.0310 (0.4740) 
Later Stage 0.0641 (0.2550) 
 
0.0763 (0.3620)  0.0109 (0.8300) 
Constant -0.7125* (0.0540) 
 
-0.4759 (0.2040)  0.3630* (0.0760) 
Likelihood Ratio -613.68 
  
-580.91 
 
 -5241.32  
Number of observations 1000 
  
1000 
 
 1000  
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Table 7: Average Abnormal Returns around the Event Date 
Panel A shows average abnormal returns for CVC investments that are announced 
(first column) and un-announced (second column). The average abnormal returns are 
computed using the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985). The last column gives 
the t-test of the difference in means tests between announced and un-announced 
average abnormal returns. Panel B shows statistics on the cumulative abnormal 
returns over the [-10,+10] days window around the event date, as well as results of 
the difference in means test between the two subsamples. Significance levels: ***, 
**, * indicates 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Average Abnormal Returns 
Days around the event Announced Un-announced Diff-test 
-10 0.0079 -0.0037 1.7370* 
-9 -0.0026 0.0048 -3.0368** 
-8 0.0050 0.0065 -0.6106 
-7 
-0.0035 -0.0091 -5.1708*** 
-6 
-0.0084 0.0016 -4.1074*** 
-5 -0.0033 -0.0018 -2.0639** 
-4 -0.0049 -0.0025 -3.0294** 
-3 0.0012 -0.0056 -1.8128* 
-2 0.0011 -0.0016 -0.2187* 
-1 0.0072 -0.0018 2.1841** 
0 0.0212 0.0052 6.5440*** 
+1 0.0021 -0.0018 0.1307* 
+2 -0.0052 -0.0057 -4.4922*** 
+3 -0.0084 -0.0052 -5.5676*** 
+4 0.0012 -0.0006 0.2466 
+5 -0.0067 -0.0053 -4.9229*** 
+6 0.0057 -0.0069 -0.4673 
+7 -0.0037 0.0052 -3.6442*** 
+8 -0.0020 -0.0023 -1.7313* 
+9 -0.0045 0.0016 -2.5008** 
+10 0.0038 -0.0015 0.9341 
Panel B:  Cumulative abnormal returns over various windows. 
 
Announced Un-announced Diff-test 
CAR [-2,+2]  Mean ( p-val ) 0.0263(0.0000) -0.0057(0.0000) 8.4359*** 
CAR [-3,+3] Mean ( p-val ) 0.0191(0.0000) -0.0166 (0.0000) 1.0234 
CAR [-4,+2] Mean ( p-val ) 0.0226 (0.0000) -0.0139 (0.00000) -5.6695*** 
CAR [-10,+10] Mean (p-val) 0.0032 (0.0442) -0.035 (0.0000) -13.0222*** 
Number of observations 635 365 
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Table 8: Stock Price Reaction to Information Disclosure  
This table shows Heckman estimation. The variable Announced Dummy equals one if the investment 
was announced, and zero otherwise. The other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. Lambda is the 
/ŶǀĞƌƐĞDŝůůƐ ?ZĂƚŝŽƚŚĂƚĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƐĨŽƌƉŽƐƐŝble sample selection biases in the outcome equation. We 
control for industry and year effects. Significance levels: ***,**,* indicates 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Outcome equation: 
Dep. Var.= CAR [-10,+10] 
Selection equation: 
Dep. Var.= Announced Dummy  
Variables Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Announced Dummy 0.0074*** (0.0000) - - 
ln(Round Amount) 0.0016* (0.0820) - - 
ln(Total Assets) 0.0021** (0.0350) - - 
Information Asymmetry Index 0.0111*** (0.0020) 0.1061*** (0.0010) 
ln(Long-Term Debt) 0.0008 (0.2920) -0.0010 (0.5200) 
Negative NI 0.0030 (0.7670) -0.0367 (0.5290) 
Sales Growth 0.0001 (0.5340) 0.0004 (0.2910) 
Lambda ,QYHUVH0LOOV¶5DWLR -0.0077 (0.1160) - - 
Seed Stage - - -0.1750** (0.0200) 
Early Stage - - -0.0266 (0.1830) 
Expansion Stage - - 0.0240 (0.5420) 
Later Stage - - 0.0679 (0.6130) 
Constant 0.0243 (0.1020) -0.2856 (0.1870) 
Number of observations 1000 
 
1000  
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Table 9: Stock Price Reaction to Information Disclosure for Different CAR Windows  
The table shows similar regressions as Table 5 but with different windows of CAR measurements. The 
variable Announced Dummy equals one if the investment was announced, and zero otherwise. The other 
variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. >ĂŵďĚĂŝƐƚŚĞ/ŶǀĞƌƐĞDŝůůƐ ?ZĂƚŝŽƚŚĂƚĐŽƌƌĞcts for possible sample 
selection biases in the outcome equation. We control for industry and year effects. Significance levels: 
***,**,* indicates 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variables Model I [-2,+2]   Model II [-3,+3]   Model III [-4,+2]  
  Coefficient P-value 
 
Coefficient P-value 
 
Coefficient P-value 
Announced Dummy 0.0201*** (0.0000) 
 
0.0189*** (0.0000) 
 
0.0156*** (0.0000) 
ln(Round Amount) 0.0036* (0.0520) 
 
0.0018* (0.0610) 
 
0.0019 (0.1660) 
ln(Total Assets) 0.0035** (0.0390) 
 
0.0008 (0.5580) 
 
0.0026** (0.0420) 
Information Asymmetry Index 0.0111** (0.0120) 
 
0.0208*** (0.0000) 
 
0.0190*** (0.0000) 
ln(Long-Term Debt) 0.0021 (0.1800) 
 
0.0004 (0.4960) 
 
0.0010 (0.2520) 
Negative NI -0.0022 (0.1390) 
 
0.0043 (0.9830) 
 
0.0030 (0.1200) 
Sales Growth 0.0001 (0.6980) 
 
0.0001 (0.6640) 
 
0.0001 (0.7720) 
Lambda ,QYHUVH0LOOV¶5DWLR -0.0397* (0.0970) 
 
-0.0076 (0.5410) 
 
-0.0196 (0.2340) 
Constant 0.0186 (0.2650) 
 
0.0060 (0.2190) 
 
-0.0427 (0.4780) 
Number of observations 1000 
  
1000 
  
1000 
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APPENDIX 1: Comparison of the VentureXpert Sample and our Random Sample 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of CVC characteristics. Panel A shows the statistics for full 
sample of CVC during 2002 through 2012 extracted from VentureXpert. Panel B shows the statistics 
of the random sample during the same period. Panel B also provides significance level of difference 
in means tests between values from Panels A and B. Significance levels: ***,**,* indicates 1% 5% and 
10% respectively (n.s. for > 10%). 
Panel A: Full sample Characteristics of CVC Investments 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Round Amount 16650.44 10000 30069.91 1.0000 585000 
Round Number 3.3401 3.0000 2.3841 1.0000 20.0000 
Number of Investors 4.8081 4.0000 3.4882 1.0000 26.0000 
Seed Stage 0.0561 0.0000 0.2290 0.0000 1.0000 
Early Stage 0.2202 0.0000 0.4141 0.0000 1.0000 
Expansion Stage 0.3641 0.0000 0.4810 0.0000 1.0000 
Later Stage 0.2633 0.0000 0.4402 0.0000 1.0000 
Other Stages 0.0970 0.0000 0.2961 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of observations 2588 
    
Panel B: Random sample 
 
Round Amount 16479.28n.s. 10000 25964.76 1.0000 460000 
Round Number 3.4191n.s. 3.0000 2.4261 1.0000 20.0000 
Number of Investors 4.8461n.s. 4.0000 3.3922 1.0000 26.0000 
Seed Stage 0.0482n.s. 0.0000 0.2140 0.0000 1.0000 
Early Stage 0.2230n.s. 0.0000 0.4171 0.0000 1.0000 
Expansion Stage 0.3501n.s. 0.0000 0.4772 0.0000 1.0000 
Later Stage 0.2682n.s. 0.0000 0.4430 0.0000 1.0000 
Other Stages 0.1091n.s. 0.0000 0.3120 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of observations 1000         
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APPENDIX 2: Summary Statistics on Industry Classification of Parent Companies 
This table shows the distribution of our sample by industry using the Fama-French 12 
industry classification of parent companies. Panel A shows the distribution of announced 
investments, while Panel B shows the distribution of un-announced investments. Panel B 
also provides significance level of difference in means tests between values from Panels A 
and B. Significance levels: ***,**,* indicates 1% 5% and 10% respectively (n.s. for > 10%). 
Panel A: Announced deals 
 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consumer Non-Durables 0.0095 0.0000 0.0971 0.0000 1.0000 
Consumer Durables 0.0127 0.0000 0.1120 0.0000 1.0000 
Manufacturing 0.0428 0.0000 0.2025 0.0000 1.0000 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 0.0143 0.0000 0.1187 0.0000 1.0000 
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.0206 0.0000 0.1422 0.0000 1.0000 
Business Equipment 0.5689 1.0000 0.4956 0.0000 1.0000 
Telephone and Television Transmission 0.0919 0.0000 0.2891 0.0000 1.0000 
Utilities 0.0032 0.0000 0.0563 0.0000 1.0000 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 0.0475 0.0000 0.2130 0.0000 1.0000 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 0.1094 0.0000 0.3123 0.0000 1.0000 
Money Finance 0.0238 0.0000 0.1525 0.0000 1.0000 
Other 0.0555 0.0000 0.2291 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of observations 635 
    Panel B: un-announced deals 
     Consumer Non-Durables 0.0225n.s. 0.0000 0.1486 0.0000 1.0000 
Consumer Durables 0.0028n.s. 0.0000 0.0531 0.0000 1.0000 
Manufacturing 0.0394n.s. 0.0000 0.1949 0.0000 1.0000 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 0.0169n.s. 0.0000 0.1291 0.0000 1.0000 
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.0085n.s. 0.0000 0.0917 0.0000 1.0000 
Business Equipment 0.4761n.s. 0.0000 0.5001 0.0000 1.0000 
Telephone and Television Transmission 0.1408n.s. 0.0000 0.3484 0.0000 1.0000 
Utilities 0.0113n.s. 0.0000 0.1057 0.0000 1.0000 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 0.0451n.s. 0.0000 0.2078 0.0000 1.0000 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 0.1493n.s. 0.0000 0.3569 0.0000 1.0000 
Money Finance 0.0282n.s. 0.0000 0.1657 0.0000 1.0000 
Other 0.0592n.s. 0.0000 0.2362 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of observations 365         
 
 
 
 
